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Non-technical summary
In the light of high and even rising unemployment levels in Germany, an improved
knowledge of how individual characteristics as well as the regional and institutional
context shape labor market outcomes of unemployed jobseekers is of central con-
cern to policy makers aiming to design policies that contribute to a shorter average
unemployment duration. Recent labor market reforms in Germany aim, among
other things, at reducing unemployment by restricting passive unemployment mea-
sures, emphasizing local labor market policies and re-structuring public employment
services. Empirical evidence regarding the extent to which the regional and insti-
tutional context shape labor market outcomes of unemployed jobseekers, however,
is quite incomplete. In order to fill this research gap, we explore the main indi-
vidual, regional as well as institutional determinants of unemployment duration in
Germany. For this purpose, we use a rich set of indicators that capture passive
and active labor market policies as well as local economic conditions and job coun-
selling activities. Moreover, we distinguish three main exit states each of which are
affected quite differently by the regional and institutional context: exits to local
regular employment, exits to non-local employment via migration and exits to sub-
sidized employment. By doing so, we provide evidence about the extent to which
recent reforms concerning passive labor market measures, regional employment poli-
cies and the organization of public employment services are likely to contribute to
a reduction of unemployment duration.
We generally obtain that individual characteristics strongly affect the duration
of unemployment and the chosen destination state while the effect of local labor
market conditions is often rather small. Regional disparities thus appear to be
much less important than usually considered by the German public and by German
policy makers. Therefore, our results suggest that regional policies may only be a
supplementary means of improving labour market outcomes of unemployed individ-
uals. Similarly, there is no evidence that public counselling efforts and active labour
market policies have much of an shortening effect on the duration of unemployment.
Instead, the results point towards the role of the unemployment compensation and
welfare system in shaping individual unemployment experiences. Individuals with
low pre-unemployment earnings and thus high income replacement rates have the
lowest exit rates to regular employment. This suggests that the reduction of unem-
ployment benefits is likely to drastically shorten unemployment for certain groups.
Unemployment Duration in Germany:
Individual and Regional Determinants of Local Job
Finding, Migration and Subsidized Employment ∗
Melanie Arntz†
Ralf A. Wilke‡
December 2006
∗We would like thank Olaf Schoffer (Statistisches Sachsen) for making the estimations with
the Sozialhilfestatistik and Aderonke Osikominu for preparation of the IEBS. We would also like
to thank Frederik Schneider, Eva Mu¨ller, Philipp Zahn and Stefan Ro¨th for their research as-
sistance and Martina Oertel and Ralf Zimmermann (IAB) for all their help with the IEBS and
Guenther Klee (IAW) for the supply of many regional indicators. Comments from Henrik Winter-
hager, anonymous referees, a co-editor and the participants at numerous seminars are gratefully
acknowledged. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the German Ministry
of Labour and Social Affairs through the research project Evaluation of the experimentation clause
§ 6c SGB II (Social Security Code) - comparative evaluation of the success on the labor market
of the responsibility models opting municipality (Optierende Kommune) and consortium (ARGE)
- research field 1: descriptive analysis and matching. This work uses the Sample of the Integrated
Employment Biographies V.1 (IEBS) of the Research Data Centre (Forschungsdatenzentrum) of
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) at the Institute of Employment Re-
search (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). The delivery and the use of the data
is in compliance with § 75 SGB X. The IAB does not take any responsibility for the use of its data.
†Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim), P.O.Box 10 34 43, 68034
Mannheim, Germany, E-mail: arntz@zew.de
‡University of Leicester, Department of Economics, University Road, Leicester LE17RH, UK,
E-mail: raw27@le.ac.uk
Abstract
Recent labor market reforms in Germany aim, among other things, at
reducing unemployment by restricting passive unemployment measures, em-
phasizing local labor market policies and re-structuring public employment
services. This paper uses extensive individual administrative and regional
aggregate data to explore the extent to which these factors are likely to con-
tribute to the shortening of unemployment duration. For this purpose, we
estimate a semi-parametric duration model with three competing exit states.
Our results suggest that changes in the unemployment compensation system
rather than local employment policies and administrative restructuring efforts
meet expected labor market outcomes. In addition, determinants of the length
of unemployment vary across exit states.
Keywords: competing-risk, labor market policy, individual and regional data
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1 Introduction
Throughout the last two decades Germany has experienced persistently high, and
even rising, levels of unemployment. At the same time, the share of long-term unem-
ployed who remain unemployed even after one year of job search has also gone up.
According to Machin and Manning (1999), the share of long-term unemployment in
Germany was almost 50% in 1995. This is much higher than in the US, but reflects
a labor market situation that is not uncommon in many European countries. In
this context, improved knowledge of how individual characteristics as well as the
regional and institutional context shape labor market outcomes of unemployed job-
seekers is of central concern to policy makers aiming to design policies that will
contribute to a shortening of the average unemployment duration. However, most
research on the determinants of unemployment duration has been confined to an
analysis of individual level determinants (Steiner, 1990; Hunt, 1995; Hujer and
Schneider, 1996; Steiner, 2001) and the role of the individual employment histo-
ries in determining the duration of unemployment (Lu¨demann, Wilke and Zhang,
2006; Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006b). Passive labour market policies such as un-
employment benefit entitlements as a determinant of unemployment duration have
also featured prominently in research undertaken in other European countries (e.g.
Carling et al. 1996; Roed and Zhang, 2003; Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2005; Lalive,
van Ours and Zweimu¨ller, 2006; Kyyra¨ and Wilke, 2007). Much less attention has
been paid to the regional determinants of the unemployment duration. Most studies
only test for additional region-specific effects (Folmer and van Dijke, 1988; Brown
and Sessions, 1997; Fahrmeir et al., 2003) and conclude that the regional context is
a significant determinant of the individual unemployment duration even after con-
trolling for major individual-specific factors. Other studies only assess the impact of
the local unemployment rate or the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio as an indicator
of local demand deficiency on individual unemployment duration (Lindeboom et al.
1994; Petrongolo 2001; Haurin and Sridhar 2003) and typically find the expected
prolonging effect of deficient local labor demand on the duration of unemployment.
Both of these approaches remain rather incomplete with respect to improving our
understanding of the regional factors that prolong or shorten unemployment. We do
not know much either about how the institutional context such as local labor mar-
ket policies and the organization of local job placement activities affect individual
labor market outcomes. This research gap is particularly surprising in the German
2
context because, among other things, recent labor market reforms emphasize the
role of regionally targeted policy mixes and the organizational structure of public
employment services. In particular, German policy makers as well as the public
consider a high ratio of job counselers to unemployed jobseekers as a key to reduce
the duration of unemployment.
The objective of this study is therefore to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
unemployment duration in Germany. We identify the determinants of the length
of unemployment not only among individual characteristics, but also consider the
regional and institutional context in which individuals seek employment. For this
purpose, our analysis uses a rich set of indicators that capture passive and active
labor market policies as well as local economic conditions and job counseling activ-
ities. Moreover, we use a new generation of German administrative individual data
that allows three main exit states to be identified each of which may be affected
quite differently by the regional and institutional context: exits to local regular
employment, exits to non-local employment via migration and exits to subsidized
employment. Previously available data sources did not allow exits to subsidized
employment to be distinguished from exits to regular employment. As a conse-
quence, estimated effects of covariates on the duration of unemployment may have
been biased if there are heterogenous effects of covariates on different exit types.
In the case of subsidized and regular employment, biases are quite likely because
labor market programs typically aim at cushioning unfavorable local labor market
conditions. Thus, unfavorable labor market conditions may have an opposing ef-
fect on exits to regular and subsidized employment. Similarly, a higher migration
hazard may be a response to deficient local labor demand that lowers the hazard
of finding a local job (Arntz, 2005). The paper thus contributes to the literature
by disentangling the relevance of individual, regional and institutional factors for
exiting unemployment durations to three important exit states. Since the period
covered by our data, 2000-2004, falls mainly into the pre-reform institutional setup,
we cannot evaluate the success of recent reform efforts. Instead, our regression type
analysis aims at exploring the main individual, regional and institutional determi-
nants of unemployment duration in Germany. By doing so, we provide evidence
about the extent to which recent reforms concerning passive labor market measures,
regional employment policies and the organization of public employment services
are likely to contribute to a reduction of unemployment duration.
Our findings confirm that for both individual and regional covariates, the impact
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differs significantly depending on the type of exit. While deficient local labor demand
significantly decreases the likelihood of exiting to regular employment in the local
area, the likelihood of migration and the likelihood of entering subsidized employ-
ment significantly increases. The estimates indicate, however, that individual-level
characteristics have a much stronger impact on the duration of unemployment than
regional factors. Thus, regional policies may only be a supplementary means of
reducing the duration of unemployment. Similarly, local active labor market pro-
grams and a higher provision of counseling resources only marginally affect labor
market outcomes of unemployed jobseekers and even yield negative labor market
outcomes which would be in line with recent results for the Netherlands (van den
Berg and van den Klaauw, 2006). Among the regional and institutional factors, our
findings indicate that passive labor market policies may have the strongest impact
on the duration of unemployment in Germany. This is suggested by early retire-
ment of individuals with long entitlements to unemployment benefits as well as by
major differences in labor market outcomes of unemployed with different income
replacement rates.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed description
of the unemployment compensation and welfare system and briefly discusses recent
labour market reforms. A third section provides some theoretical underpinning on
how job search across multiple labour markets may be affected by regional and
institutional factors. Section 4 presents the individual and regional data used in the
analysis and discusses the choice of covariates. We then explain the methodological
approach before presenting the results in section 6. Section 7 concludes and discusses
the results in light of the recent reforms.
2 Institutional context in Germany
Until 2004 the German unemployment compensation system consisted of two main
components: unemployment benefits (UB) and unemployment assistance (UA). Un-
employment benefits which were paid for a period of up to 32 months, depending on
an individual’s age and employment history, were equal to 60 % (67%) of the last net
income for unemployed individuals without (with) dependent children. Tax-funded
and means-tested unemployment assistance was paid indefinitely to individuals who
had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit and continued to provide
income replacement rates of 53% (57%) for individuals without (with) dependent
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children. This combination of generous replacement rates for long-term unemployed
and indefinite entitlement length was rather exceptional among the OECD countries.
As a consequence, replacement rates for long-term unemployed in Germany were and
still are higher than in many other OECD countries, especially for older unemployed
with extended periods of entitlement to UB and for unemployed with low former
earnings who receive complementary tax funded social benefits. This meant that
income replacement rates higher than 70% or even over 100% were common practice
for the latter group. From a search-theoretical perspective, high replacement rates
raise reservation wages and thus prolong unemployment as the potential net gain
from working compared to not working is small (Mortensen, 1980; Rogerson et al.,
2005). The institutional design in Germany thus results in work disincentives that
are considered to be partly responsible for the high share of long-term unemploy-
ment in Germany and the considerably higher share of long term unemployment
among older people (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004) and the low wage unemployed
(Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006b). Moreover, the institutional design has also been
associated with a lack of jobs for low-skilled workers in Germany as the social benefit
level implies a relatively high minimum wage that is above the productivity level of
many low-skilled unemployed. The subsequent empirical analysis of unemployment
periods between 2000 and 2004 thus draws specific attention to the unemployment
experiences of individuals with low earning capacities.
The ”Hartz reforms” introduced between 2002 and 2005 ushered in marked
changes in active and passive labour market policies. While the Hartz IV reform
that merged social benefits and unemployment assistance to create the new social
benefit1 (Arbeitslosengeld II) was not implemented before 2005 and is thus not rele-
vant for our analysis, the Hartz I-III reforms already started in 2003 (see Jacobi and
Kluve (2006) for an extensive overview). These reforms mainly aim at activating the
unemployed and increasing the efficiency of employment services and measures. For
this purpose, the reform shifts resources from labour market programs aimed at the
secondary labour market such as work creation schemes (ABM ) to measures that
aim at integrating individuals into the regular labour market (e.g. training, subsidies
for regular employment and self-employment). In order to improve the efficiency of
allocated resources, programs are targeted more strictly to specific groups of un-
1The ALG II provides almost the same level of benefits as former social benefits, while it is
below the UA for individuals with high pre-unemployment earnings. The unemployment insurance
based UB was basically left untouched.
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employed. After profiling jobseekers according to their chances of finding regular
employment, specific reintegration measures are restricted to those who have a fair
chance of being reintegrated into the labour market, while work creation schemes
are targeted to jobseekers with less promising prospects. In order to activate the
unemployed to make as much effort as possible to regain employment, the reforms
introduced stricter sanction rules in the case of insufficient search efforts, but also
offered a new set of programs such as subsidies for people wishing to set up busi-
nesses (Ich-AG) and subsidies for employers hiring individuals with low productivity
levels.
Another key objective of the reforms was the restructuring and modernization
of the federal employment agency (FEA) in order to increase the effectiveness of
its placement services. For this purpose, its regional employment agencies intro-
duced a client-oriented New Customer Service Centre (Kundenzentrum). An entry
zone for customer requests and questions in addition to scheduled appointments for
job counseling now prevent long waiting times and increases efficiency. Moreover,
computer-based assessments now help in analyzing the needs of each customer and
thus support tailor-made solutions. These modernization measures also aimed at
reducing the workload of each counsellor in order to improve the quality of job
counseling. This new emphasis on job counseling has been facilitated by an increase
in the number of job placement counsellors since 2002 of almost 30% and a conse-
quent improvement in the counsellor/customer ratio, i.e. the number of unemployed
assisted per placement counsellor.
Another important aspect of the reform concerns the organization of employment
services. In contrast to the former hierarchical organization, far greater responsi-
bility has now been assigned to local employment agencies. Each local employment
agency now has to achieve stipulated quantitative goals which are tailored to the
specific situation of its regional labour market. For such controlling purposes and
the design of regionally tailored policy mixes, the federal employment agency asked
its research institute, the IAB (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung) to
identify employment agencies with comparable regional conditions. The resulting
12 strategic types of employment agencies range from regional employment agencies
with unfavourable labour market conditions in eastern Germany to agencies with
favourable and dynamic labour market conditions (Blien et al., 2005). The restruc-
turing of the federal employment agency has therefore resulted in an emphasis on job
counseling and efficient placement services as well as an emphasis on labour market
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policies which are targeted to the regional labour market. These internal changes of
the FEA were mainly executed by leading international consulting companies who
received hundred of millions of euros for their input. An empirical analysis of the
institutional features is therefore of high policy interest. Since the period covered by
our data falls mainly into the pre-reform institutional setup of the FEA, we cannot
evaluate the success of the restructuring effort. It is, however, possible to obtain
empirical evidence about whether one may expect these changes to bring about a
strong reduction in unemployment duration. In this respect, our analysis is aimed
at examining the extent to which institutional and regional factors affect the labour
market outcomes of jobseekers in Germany once individual factors have been taken
into account. For this purpose, we use a broad number of covariates that capture
the regional context and some institutional features such as the counsellor/customer
ratio. Moreover, we look at exits from unemployment not only to regular but also
to subsidized employment and take account of the particularities of the German
unemployment compensation and welfare system by distinguishing between groups
of different earning capacities.
3 Some theoretical underpinning
Before turning to the empirical approach of our analysis, this section briefly discusses
how labour market conditions may affect labour market outcomes after unemploy-
ment. In this context it is worth considering a framework in which a jobseeker looks
for employment in a number of distinct labour markets. In the case of simultaneous
job-search across these labour markets2, the probability of exiting to any of those
labour markets can be broken down into the job offer probability and the probability
of accepting a job offer in this labour market, both of which depend on exogenous
market conditions and the endogenous search strategy adopted by the unemployed
job searcher. In particular, jobseekers choose reservation wages for each of the dis-
tinct markets such that the value of employment at the offered wage is equivalent
to the value of continuing the unemployed job search. Moreover, search effort is
allocated across the markets so that the marginal value of additional search in each
market is equal to the marginal cost of searching the market. While reservation
2Alternatively, one may assume some sort of sequential search strategy (Salop, 1973; McCall
and McCall, 1987). Accordingly, an unemployed job seeker searches sequentially according to the
expected returns from searching a particular market segment.
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wages affect job acceptance probability, the allocation of search effort across dis-
tinct markets influences the job offer probability. Intuitively, an individual’s search
strategy should favor finding employment in those labour markets that offer the best
work conditions. In the case of job search across multiple industries, Fallick (1992)
has shown that improving conditions in one labour market - i.e. increasing job offer
probability - raises reservation wages in all markets while at the same time shifting
search effort towards the improving market and reducing search effort in all others.
As a consequence, changing exogenous conditions affect the hazard of exiting to a
specific market not only directly due to, for example, higher job offer probabilities,
but also affect these hazards indirectly via the endogenous search strategy of the
unemployed job searcher. A similar notion has also been applied to job-search across
sectors (Thomas, 1998) and regions (Damm and Rosholm, 2003; Arntz, 2005).
In our framework, we allow for a local and a non-local labour market and in-
troduce a labour market for subsidized jobs. Exits to non-local employment are
likely to constitute only a relatively small but still noticeable share of all exits as
migration levels in Germany are low compared with the US, Australia and Canada,
but among the highest compared with other European countries (OECD, 2005). We
refer to subsidized jobs whenever an individual exits to employment in the context
of an active labour market program. Such programs mainly encompass subsidized
jobs in the secondary labour market, subsidies for regular employment and subsi-
dies for self-employment (see data section for details). The reforms of recent years
have brought about a shift from subsidized jobs in the secondary labour market to
the latter two program types (BA, 2004). In 2002, more than 200,000 jobseekers
entered subsidized jobs in the secondary labour market and more than 350,000 job-
seekers received a subsidy for regular employment or self-employment (BA, 2002).
Compared with other European countries, subsidized employment in Germany is
an important part of labour market policy. While spending on active labour mar-
ket policies in Germany has been around average compared with other European
countries, the proportion spent on subsidized employment has been above average
in recent years (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Exits to subsidized employment are thus
likely to constitute a substantial part of all exits from unemployment.
Applying the above job search framework across multiple labour markets to our
particular setting, jobseekers are simultaneously looking for employment in the mar-
ket for regular3 local, regular non-local and subsidized employment. Thus, jobseekers
3Regular employment can be further differentiated by the number of hours worked or the type
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choose the search strategy, i.e. reservation wages and the search effort for each of
these markets according to the attractiveness of each of these markets in terms of job
availability, offered wages and work conditions. In many cases, labour market con-
ditions that favor an exit to local regular employment may have an opposing effect
on non-local exits (Arntz, 2005). Similarly, subsidized employment is often a means
of cushioning unfavourable local labour market conditions. Distinguishing between
these three exit states should therefore be quite helpful in understanding how the
regional and institutional context affects labour market outcomes of jobseekers in
Germany. For this purpose, the empirical analysis considers a number of indicators
that capture the exogenous conditions of the local labour market that are discussed
in detail in the next section. By affecting the search strategy, such conditions not
only affect the duration of unemployment, they also affect the probability of mak-
ing a transition to either local employment, non-local employment or subsidized
employment. Other behaviorally distinct and alternative destination states after
unemployment that, due to data limitations, are not considered here include exits
to self-employment or out of the labour force entirely. Our analysis should therefore
be considered as a starting point for improving our understanding of the impact of
labour market conditions on the labour market outcomes of unemployment.
4 Data
This section describes how we select the sample and covariates for our analysis.
We use individual data merged from several administrative registers which is then
combined with regional data from various sources.
Individual data The Sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies V.1
(IEBS) of the Research Data Centre (Forschungsdatenzentrum) of the FEA is a
new data set which was released in 2005. See Hummel et al. (2005) for a detailed
description of the data. It is a 2.2% sample containing about 1.4 million individuals
in the period 1992-2004. It comprises high quality information about employment
periods that have been subject to social insurance payments and thus excludes civil
servants and self-employed individuals. The sample also contains information on the
receipt of unemployment compensation from the FEA. For the period 2000-2004,
of job contract (temporary versus unlimited). However, the data we use does not contain the
relevant information such that we pool all types of regular employment
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the data set also provides information about participation in active labour market
programs. One of the major drawbacks of the data is that it only partially identi-
fies the true unemployment period. This is because there are unobserved periods
in the employment trajectories whenever an individual is neither a socially insured
employee nor receives unemployment compensation, nor participates in any active
labour market program. As a consequence, some parts of the individual employment
trajectory may not be observed so that various proxies for the true unemployment
period can be computed based on different criteria which define the labour market
status of being unemployed, see e.g. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) and Lee and
Wilke (2005) for this problem. In the analysis of this paper we use the following
proxy for the true unemployment duration:
• Unemployment with permanent income transfers (UPIT) is a lower
bound of the true unemployment period that defines unemployment as a con-
tinued period of transfer receipt. Gaps between transfer receipt and the be-
ginning of a new employment period need to be less than four weeks. Thus,
UPIT excludes periods of unemployment without receipt of UB or UA from
the FEA.
Unfortunately, there is no exact way of telling whether this unemployment proxy
more closely resembles the true length of unemployment than competing proxies.
As discussed in the second section, our analysis is aimed at examining determinants
of the length of unemployment specifically for unemployed social benefits recipients
because this labour market segment is likely to experience particularly long unem-
ployment periods and different exit states compared with individuals with higher
earning capacities. Comparisons of unemployment periods of social benefits recip-
ients which are contained in the Social Benefits Statistics (Sozialhilfestatistik, SH-
Stat) with unemployment spells in the IEBS defined according to the above definition
and a wider proxy which also adds nonemployment periods to the unemployment
duration suggest that the UPIT definition better represents unemployment spells
of unemployed social benefit recipients.4 Moreover, the UPIT proxy for individuals
4The use of the SHStat was confined to the research project Evaluation of the experimentation
clause §6c SGB II which was funded by the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. No
scientific use file exists for this unique data set such that apart from the comparison of both data
sets, no further analysis could be conducted. For more details on the comparison of the data sets
see Arntz et al. (2006).
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on pre-unemployment gross earnings of less than 60 euros per day turned out to
be the most suitable to represent the group of unemployed social benefit recipients.
A daily gross wage of 60 euros closely corresponds to the lowest wage quintile for
full-time employees in western Germany and to the lowest two wage quintiles for
full-time employees in eastern Germany. Since the legal minimum standard of liv-
ing is somewhat lower in eastern Germany, applying the same threshold for both
parts of Germany may be somewhat crude. Robustness checks using, for example,
unemployed in the lowest wage quintile for both parts of Germany, did not signif-
icantly change the results. Based on these robustness checks and the comparison
with unemployment periods of social benefits recipients in the SHStat, we therefore
decided to apply the UPIT definition in the subsequent empirical analysis and stick
to the chosen threshold of 60 euros daily gross earnings to distinguish individuals of
low-earning capacities from individuals with higher earning capacities. Individuals
above this threshold are less likely to receive additional social benefits and should
thus have different unemployment experiences than their low-wage counterparts.
For all UPIT unemployment spells, we observe the exit state if the spell is not
right-censored due to the end of the observation period and if the unemployed con-
tinuously receives income transfers from the FEA. As discussed in the theoretical
section, we distinguish between local regular employment, non-local regular em-
ployment (migration) and subsidized employment. We define migration as move-
ments between non-adjacent labour market regions (Arbeitsmarktregionen). The
227 labour market regions (LMRs) in Germany comprise typical daily commuting
ranges such that for the majority of individuals the workplace is located within the
LMR. Finding employment in a non-adjacent LMR therefore usually necessitates
residential mobility. We refer to subsidized employment whenever an individual
exits to socially insured employment or self-employment in the context of an ac-
tive labour market program. Such programs mainly encompass subsidized jobs
in the secondary labour market (ABM, SAM ), subsidies for regular employment
(Eingliederungszuschu¨sse, Bescha¨ftigungshilfen) and subsidies for self-employment
(Ich-AG, U¨berbru¨ckungsgeld), but also contain more extensive training programs
(FbW ) if these programs count as socially insured employment. Table 1 describes
the composition of all exits to subsidized employment observed in the IEBS for
UPIT spells starting between 2000 and 2002. For the analysis, we decided to pool
all forms of subsidized employment because robustness checks for distinguishing be-
tween certain types of programs did not yield noteworthy differences compared to
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pooling all programs.
Table 1: Composition of exits to subsidized employment, IEBS, 2000-2002
Subsidy for ... Number %
... employment in secondary market 10,391 31.0
... regular employment 9,643 28.7
... self-employment 9,001 26.8
... training measure 2,146 6.4
... other programsa 2,379 7.1
Total subsidized employment 33,560 100.0
a This category refers to a mix of programs that can be autonomously designed by each em-
ployment agency. As an example, these measures include subsidies for entering vocational
training or a premium for extending working hours of an existing job (BA, 2002).
We restrict our analysis to unemployment periods starting in the period 2000-
2002. This is because information on periods of subsidized employment is not avail-
able before 2000. Since we are able to observe information about unemployment
up to 2004 while exits to employment are only observable up to the end of 2003,
we decided to exclude spells starting in 2003. This reduces the amount of right
censoring in the data and ensures a minimum observation period of one year. Table
2 shows the sample sizes and exit types when applying the UPIT definition and dis-
tinguishing individuals by their earning capacities. We also distinguish by gender
and marital status as these characteristics are important determinants of individual
labour market outcomes.
Table 2 shows that individuals with low pre-unemployment wages are more likely
to exit to subsidized employment and less likely to migrate than jobseekers with
higher pre-unemployment earnings. Moreover, the median unemployment duration
is significantly longer for low wage earners, a finding that is in line with the expecta-
tions that the institutional framework creates disincentives for individuals with low
earning capacities to take up a job.
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Table 2: Unemployment duration and exit types by gender, marital status and earning
capacity, IEBS, 2000-2002
Low Wagea Higher wagea
Men Women Men Women
Singles
% exit to
local employment 48.1 (70.3) 51.3 (74.0) 57.9 (74.5) 53.5 (70.5)
non-local employment 6.4 (9.4) 5.6 (8.1) 9.1 (11.7) 10.3 (13.6)
subsidized employment 13.9 (20.3) 12.4 (17.9) 10.7 (13.8) 12.1 (15.9)
all exits 68.4 (100.0) 69.3 (100.0) 77.7 (100.0) 75.9 (100.0)
Unemployment spells
Median duration (days) 138 146 107 123
Number of spells 43,528 31,206 20,849 7,319
Married
% exit to
local employment 47.5 (64.9) 44.6 (60.9) 58.7 (73.3) 45.9 (72.6)
non-local employment 5.8 (7.9) 2.8 (3.4) 8.0 (10.0) 4.6 (7.3)
subsidized employment 19.9 (27.2) 14.7 (20.1) 13.4 (16.7) 12.7 (20.1)
all exits 73.2 (100.0) 62.1 (100.0) 80.1 (100.0) 63.2 (100.0)
Unemployment spells
Median duration (days) 176 238 116 194
Number of spells 28,018 31,088 23,620 5,483
a Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 euros,
while higher wages denote pre-unemployment earnings above this threshold.
Table 2 also indicates differences by gender and marital status. Singles are geo-
graphically more mobile than their married counterparts, a finding that is consistent
with the migration literature regarding higher migration costs for married people
with children (see Ghatak et al., 1996). Differences between female and male singles,
however, are very small. Since estimation results for single males and females proved
to be very similar, we decided to pool male and female singles in the subsequent anal-
ysis. By contrast, results for married individuals strongly differ by gender. Married
women have by far the longest median unemployment duration and the lowest exit
rates. This probably reflects the looser labour force attachment of married women.
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Moreover, the extremely low migration rates among married women may reflect the
fact that women are more likely to be tied to the local area if the male breadwinner
is employed locally. Due to these particularities of labour market decision of married
women, we decided to restrict the analysis to married males and single people only
and differentiate these groups by their earning capacities. Individual-level covariates
for the econometric analysis that are contained in the IEBS are age, education and
a number of indicators of an individual’s employment history such as previous un-
employment, previous participation in active labour market programs and previous
commuting status. These covariates are chosen to capture differences in job-finding
chances and migration cost that are relevant for the labour market outcomes of job-
seekers. Summary statistics of the samples used in the subsequent duration analysis
can be found in Appendix A.
Regional aggregate data We use a broad number of regional indicators which
are mainly provided by the two largest German data producers: the Federal Em-
ployment Agency and the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). The FEA data is coded
at the level of employment agency districts and contains information about labour
market tightness (e.g. vacancies, jobseekers, degree of long term unemployment),
the extent and structure of local labour market programs and the organization of
the local employment agency (e.g. number of staff). The FSO data contains county
level information about the population structure (e.g. age, education), the type of
region (urban vs. rural), its infrastructure and industrial structure. There are 180
employment agency districts and 440 counties in Germany, the exact delineation
of which are shown in Arntz and Wilke (2007). We decided not to aggregate the
regional data to labour market regions because for some indicators we only have
spatially intensive data such as percentages that cannot be easily aggregated.
The FSO and the FEA data provided us with more than 100 regional indicators,
a full list of which is included in Arntz et al. (2006). For the purposes of economet-
ric analysis, there are far too many regional covariates as there is a high degree of
correlation among several of these regional indicators. Thus, as a first step we used
a combination of cluster and factor analysis to identify indicators that contain very
similar information. In a next step, we decided to compress the regional informa-
tion further by grouping the remaining regional indicators according to economically
reasonable groups that cover major regional factors that are likely to affect unem-
ployment durations and the labour market state after unemployment as discussed
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in the theoretical framework. In particular, we create five groups and select up to
five indicators as their representatives such that the correlation among the represen-
tatives is minimized. As a consequence, the chosen representatives proxy for their
group of interest in the econometric analysis so that estimated coefficients reflect ef-
fects of the group they represent. Table 3 shows a description and summary statistics
of all regional indicators. There is a large regional variation in most of the indicators
that describe the regional labour market situation. In fact, regional disparities in
unemployment rates, for example, are among the largest in Europe (OECD, 2005).
Thus, there should be enough regional variation to identify the effect of regional
covariates on labour market outcomes. For the subsequent econometric analysis, we
standardized all continuous regional variables to ease comparability of estimation
results.
The first group of indicators characterizes local labour demand and supply
conditions, i.e. local job availability. The local unemployment rate may be consid-
ered as an indicator of deficient local labour demand. In addition, the change in the
unemployment rate compared to the previous year conveys information about the
development of the local imbalance of labour supply and demand. In regions with
an excess supply of labour, the probability of receiving a job-offer should be reduced.
As a reaction, reservation wages in all labour markets decrease since jobseekers be-
come less choosy and search effort shifts from the local to alternative markets. This
implies a decrease in the number of local jobs found and an increasing hazard of
finding a non-local or a subsidized job. An excess supply of labour may also increase
the availability of subsidized employment because corresponding labour market pro-
grams are often used to cushion unfavourable labour market conditions.
Another important determinant of unemployment duration might be local eco-
nomic performance since well-performing and dynamic regions should offer a
higher expected lifetime income and should thus attract search effort to the local
market while non-local and subsidized employment should become less attractive.
Well-performing and economically growing regions should be characterized by a high
and growing GDP per head as well as by a high level of newly established businesses.
The analysis thus includes corresponding indicators.
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Apart from the economic conditions of the locality, its social structuremay also
shape individual labour market behavior. In particular, individuals may have ”lower
incentives to work where peers are also unemployed ... and a view of joblessness as
unproblematic within a context of lowered aspirations, ...” (Ritchie et al., 2005:3). In
Germany, discouraging social contexts might be found in old industrial regions which
have experienced massive deindustrialization in recent decades and a subsequent rise
in long-term unemployment. We thus decided to include indicators such as the level
of long-term unemployment and the average schooling level in the region to control
for different social contexts. If such contexts lower work incentives, exiting to any
kind of employment may be less likely.
In addition, we use information about the institutional organization of the
local employment agency. As discussed in section 2, there has been an increase
in the number of job placement counsellors of around 30% during the period of
observations. This politically motivated increase in the counsellor/customer ratio,
i.e. the ratio between placement officers per jobseeker, provides some variation to
identify the effect of an increasing level of job counseling. We hypothesize that a
higher counsellor/customer ratio positively affects both local and the non-local job-
finding probability, but that exits to subsidized employment might be reduced if
subsidized employment to some extent substitutes for job counseling. We also in-
clude indicators of the local availability of labour market programs. As discussed in
section 2, there have been changes in the structure of labour market programs with
a shift from measures aiming at the secondary labour market to programs that aim
at integrating individuals into the regular labour market. We therefore include the
share of unemployed participating in programs with a focus on the regular labour
market such as training measures (FbW ), programs targeted to young unemployed
(JUMP)) and subsidies for regular employment or self-employment(U¨bergangsgeld,
Eingliederungszuschuss, Bescha¨ftigungshilfe) and also include the share of unem-
ployed participating in programs with a focus on the secondary market such as work
creation schemes (ABM, SAM ).5 While exits to subsidized employment should be
positively affected by the level of offered programs, the hazard of leaving the region
may be negatively affected. This regional locking-in effect of active labour market
policies has been discussed in the Scandinavian literature (e.g. Westerlund, 1998;
Fredriksson, 1999). Accordingly, a high level of local program activities may offer a
5Further differentiating the program types is problematic as we often found a high degree of
correlation between similar program types.
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substitute to departure from the region so that the search strategy of the unemployed
job searcher rather favors entering subsidized employment.
Finally, we include several structural indicators to characterize the type of
region. In particular, we include a population density related classification to dis-
tinguish between rural and urban regions. Moreover, we use driving distance to the
next higher level city as a proxy for the degree of remoteness of a region. Both of
these characteristics affect the availability and the accessibility of employment and
may thus change an individual’s search behavior. We also control for three other
regional characteristics. Regions with a high level of seasonal work, proxied for by
the flow in and out of unemployment, may be characterized by a large share of
short unemployment spells. Secondly, the local existence of third level institutions
may affect the composition of the available workforce. The availability of a highly
flexible workforce such as students may affect the competition for certain jobs and
thus affect the flow out of unemployment. Finally, we include the local availability
of child care support in order to test whether the public infrastructure affects unem-
ployment experiences of jobseekers with children. The availability of kindergarten
or nursery school might reduce the opportunity cost of local employment and thus
accelerate exits to local employment.
5 Methodological issues
Let F (t) be the unemployment duration distribution, where t is the duration of
unemployment. The hazard rate, h(t) = {∂F (t)/∂t}/(1− F (t)), is an intuitive way
of formalizing transitions from unemployment to employment. In our econometric
analysis we use a hazard rate model to investigate the effect of various covariates x =
{x1, x2} on the distribution of unemployment, where x1 denotes the set of individual
characteristics such as demographics, socio-economics, work history variables and
firm-level variables, while x2 contains all remaining regional indicators. In particular,
we estimate a competing-risk Cox-proportional hazard model
hj(t|x) = λj(t)exp(αjx1 + βjx2),
where j denotes the exits to local regular employment, subsidized employment and
non-local employment, i.e. migration, and λj is the destination specific baseline
hazard rate.
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There are three major sources of biases that have to be addressed when using this
approach. First of all, there may be biases from unobserved individual heterogene-
ity. As suggested by Meyer (1990), however, unobserved individual heterogeneity
may not have much of an effect if there is a flexible baseline hazard that partly
absorbs this heterogeneity. Secondly, there may be a simultaneity issue of the re-
gional covariates if an exit directly affects the covariates used in the analysis. This
may be the case if an exit to local employment reduces the unemployment rate or
if an exit to subsidized employment increases the offer rate for active labour mar-
ket programs. For this reason, all regional covariates have been calculated as the
average value for the 12 months preceding the start of unemployment. Estimation
results may, however, still be biased if regional characteristics that are correlated
to the observed covariates are omitted. In the literature, this problem has been ad-
dressed by stratification (see Ridder and Tunali, 1990). When stratifying according
to regional labour markets, separate baseline hazards are estimated for each regional
labour market. This approach resembles the well-known fixed effects approach and
thus controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the level of regional labour markets.
Unfortunately, our data is limited to a relatively short time span. Thus, a stratified
estimation approach turns out to be infeasible since, in this case, identification rests
on time variation. We are nonetheless fairly confident that biases from omitted re-
gional characteristics may be negligible due to the rich account of regional covariates
used in the analysis.
As has been discussed by Thomas (1996), in a competing-risk duration analysis,
the estimated parameter vector (αj, βj) may not be interpreted as the effect on
the duration until exit to state j. Instead, the effect on this duration depends on
parameter vectors for all states. In particular, define the conditional cumulative
probability of exiting to state j until t as
Πj(t|x) =
∫ t
0
hj(t|x)(1−G(t|x))dt
with hj(s) as the exit hazard to state j and (1−G(s)) as the overall survival prob-
ability that takes account of all exit options. In our empirical analysis we evaluate
the estimates at xl ∈ {x¯l, 0}, where we choose the average values of all individual
level variables (x1 = x¯1) and we choose zero for the regional variables (x2 = 0).
6 We
estimate the probability of exiting to state j as the duration elapses one year, i.e.
6This corresponds to the sample mean value of the continuous regional variables and to the
reference category of the regional dummy variables.
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Πj(365|x). We compute the marginal effects ∂Πj(365|x)/∂xk as the marginal change
of the cumulative probability of exiting to state j during the first year if one regres-
sor xk changes. This outcome is of particular political interest because long-term
unemployment starts after one year of unemployment. Thus, our marginal effects
correspond to the change in probability of becoming long-term unemployed that is
due to a marginal increase of covariate k.7 Based on 500 samples, we estimate the
standard error of the conditional marginal effect bootstrap distribution. Assuming
that standard errors are distributed normally, we then determine the significance
level of the estimated marginal effects.
6 Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimated conditional marginal effects for single people
and married men of low and higher earning capacities. We generally find that the
individual work-history seems to be the driving force behind the duration of unem-
ployment, a result that is similar to Lu¨demann et al. (2006) and Fitzenberger and
Wilke (2006b) who use data without information on subsidized employment and on
migration. Our results also indicate some convergence of the conditional distribu-
tion of unemployment duration in western and eastern Germany during the years
2000-2004. Compared to the impact of individual characteristics, regional disparities
only marginally affect the length of unemployment periods in Germany as has also
been suggested by Arntz (2005) who uses data without information on subsidized
employment. Thus, although some regional factors significantly affect both the un-
employment duration and the likelihood of ending up in a specific destination state,
our results suggest that the recent emphasis on regional policies, regionally tailored
policy mixes and the organization of public employment services is unlikely to bring
about a substantial reduction in the length of unemployment in Germany. Rather,
there is some evidence that certain regional policies such as the local provision of
7Since Πj(t|x) has the properties of a distribution function, one may define the conditional
marginal quantile effect at quantile q as ∂tˆj(q|x)/∂xk = ∂Π−1j (q|x)/∂xk as an alternative marginal
effect. Since the underlying unemployment duration distribution is defective, Π−1j (q|x) does not
exist for the upper quantiles so that 0 ≤ Πj(t|x) ≤ q¯|x ≤ 1. Moreover, the maximum quantile for
which this marginal effect can be identified varies by covariate and destination state, i.e. q¯jk. For
this reason, we decided to report the marginal effect on the cumulative probability Πj(365|x) only.
Marginal quantile effects are available from the authors upon request.
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active labour market programs may even yield negative labour market outcomes.
In what follows we present a detailed discussion of the estimation results for the
individual-specific covariates before turning to the regional covariates. In line with
the finding that regional covariates have only a limited impact on individual labour
market outcomes, we also find only few general and robust result patterns across the
four sub-groups. A detailed discussion of each single effect thus seems an infeasible
approach for the regional covariates. Instead, we only focus on the most important
results for each group of regional covariates and point to the most interesting and
robust differences across the sub-samples.
Socio-demographics Several socio-economic variables significantly affect the du-
ration of unemployment8, but only few of them have a strong effect. Among the most
important for all exit states of single people and married men alike is age. Generally,
the older unemployed, especially those aged 56 or older, are less likely to take up
regular employment locally, are less likely to migrate and are more likely to end up
in subsidized employment. Among unemployed people with higher earning capaci-
ties, the older unemployed are only less likely to exit to local regular employment.
We can also confirm the results of earlier studies with regard to educational attain-
ments: a higher educational degree does not improve the likelihood of local regular
employment. Instead, unemployed people with a university degree are more likely
to enter subsidized employment and they are much more likely to migrate if they
are single. Among married men with a university degree, lower exit probabilities to
local regular employment are only partly compensated for by higher exit probabili-
ties to subsidized employment. Interestingly, married men with a university degree
are not significantly more mobile than their less educated counterparts. The lower
earning capacities associated with higher income replacement rates rather than the
observed educational degree are thus able to explain the high share of long term
unemployment among the unskilled in Germany. This also confirms our approach
in this paper to stratifying the sample with respect to the wage level.
Work history variables These characteristics have the strongest influence on the
unemployment duration distribution and effects are typically similar for all samples.
In particular, long entitlement periods for unemployment benefits (UB) and former
8When the effect is similar for all destinations we simply use the notion unemployment or
unemployment duration.
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employment subsidies by the federal employment agency strongly decrease the like-
lihood of local regular employment. Our results therefore suggest that both passive
and active labour market measures are strongly associated with negative individual
labour market outcomes. We do not, however, read this as a causal relationship,
as these results may partially be driven by unobserved factors such as a negative
selection of unemployed into subsidized employment. In the case of very long en-
titlement periods (> 24 months) any destination is much less likely because this
form of unemployment is associated with early retirement such that this group of
unemployed rarely looks for a new job. This effect is typically observed for very
long entitlement periods and it is more pronounced among unemployed with higher
former wages. We also obtain strong result patterns if an unemployed person was
already subsidized by the local employment office at the end of his last unemploy-
ment period or just before the start of the current unemployment period. If these
individuals slip back into unemployment they have a very low transition probability
to either local or non-local regular employment. Instead, a high percentage of these
individuals ends up in another subsidized employment period. We are therefore able
to identify what is typically called a ”career of labour market measures”.9 Using
the newer generation of individual administrative data we are now able to identify
this important determinant.
Furthermore, we do not observe a stigmatizing effect of former unemployment
periods in the sense that it increases unemployment duration. This is in line with
several former studies based on administrative data. We also identify several factors
that increase exit probabilities among the unemployed. Individuals who have pre-
viously been recalled by their former employer, have much shorter unemployment
periods due to faster local exits. Moreover, this group is less likely to be subsidized
or to migrate, and this suggests that recalls are related to seasonal unemployment
and temporary lay-offs. Being in minor employment10 at the beginning of the unem-
ployment period considerably increases local job finding and reduces the likelihood
of migration in many cases.
9We also made estimations in which we distinguished between several types of employment
subsidies offered by the employment agencies. Surprisingly, the results patterns are similar even
for subsidized artificial jobs and temporary subsidies of regular employment which have a very
purpose. For this we decided to report the pooled results only.
10An employment on a salary of less than 400 euros per month and with exemption from social
security contributions.
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Table 4: Marginal effects in pp on the conditional cumu-
lative probability of exiting to local, subsidized or non-
local employment, Singles
Low wage Higher wage
Variable local subsidized non-local local subsidized non-local
Individual characteristics
Female 7.6∗∗ -0.8† 0.6† 2.9∗ -0.5 2.1∗∗
Age < 26 16.7∗∗ -0.9∗∗ 1.2∗∗ 11.7∗∗ -2.2∗∗ 0.0
Age 26-35 3.7∗∗ 0.4† 1.1∗∗ 4.2∗∗ 0.7† 1.0∗∗
Age 46-56 -9.6∗∗ 1.5∗∗ -0.9∗∗ -4.5∗∗ 0.2 -0.2
Age > 56 -22.2∗∗ -0.8 -1.7∗∗ -12.2∗∗ -5.4∗∗ -0.1
Unskilled -3.0∗∗ 0.5∗∗ 0.2 -2.8∗∗ 0.0 1.4∗∗
University degree -2.6 3.0∗∗ 3.6∗∗ -9.8∗∗ 3.2∗∗ 1.6∗∗
Foreign born -1.4 -1.0∗ 0.6 -3.8∗∗ -1.3 -1.3∗∗
Female foreign born -2.1 -1.9∗ -1.4∗∗ -1.1 1.5 -1.4
Children -2.1∗∗ 0.7∗∗ -0.1 -1.8† 0.4 0.4
Children & female -4.7∗∗ -0.2 -2.2∗∗ -1.7 1.1 -2.6∗∗
Minor job 9.2∗∗ 0.0 -0.4† 3.9 1.5 -3.4∗∗
Spell starts in winter 4.7∗∗ 0.8∗∗ 0.2 7.1∗∗ -1.0∗∗ 0.2
Previous employment history
Part time -5.3∗∗ -0.9∗∗ 0.0 5.0∗∗ -1.2† 2.4∗∗
Lower/upper wage‡ -2.7∗∗ 1.1∗∗ -0.5∗∗ -5.2∗∗ 1.6∗∗ 4.5∗∗
Lower/upper wage† & female 0.8 -0.2 0.6∗ 2.2 0.7 -0.8∗
Construction 8.5∗∗ -1.2∗∗ -0.8∗∗ 10.3∗∗ -1.9† -2.2∗∗
Trade and Food Ind. 7.7∗∗ -0.6∗ -0.1 3.8∗∗ 0.8 -2.0∗∗
Services/Public sector 3.8∗∗ -0.5∗∗ 0.6∗∗ -3.4∗∗ 1.7∗∗ -0.5∗
Previously recalled 15.7∗∗ -1.7∗∗ -0.4∗ 14.8∗∗ -4.6∗∗ 0.4
Previously unemployed 1.3∗∗ 1.0∗∗ -0.4∗∗ 1.9∗∗ -0.4 0.0
Large firm -2.7∗∗ -1.2∗∗ 0.2 -5.9∗∗ -1.6∗∗ 0.7∗
BE 6-12 mths 3.7∗∗ 0.3 0.1 -2.7∗∗ 2.2∗∗ -1.2∗∗
BE 12-18 mths -1.0 0.5 0.2 -9.7∗∗ 2.5∗ -1.5∗∗
BE 18-24 mths -3.7 0.9 -1.1† -15.1∗∗ 4.0∗∗ -2.9∗∗
BE > 24 mths -21.0∗∗ -1.7∗ -1.9∗∗ -28.2∗∗ 1.6 -4.7∗∗
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ALMP measure -31.1∗∗ 7.2∗∗ -2.0∗∗ -25.2∗∗ 12.7∗∗ -1.8∗∗
Commuter -4.6∗∗ 0.3† 5.6 ∗∗ -11.8∗∗ 0.7† 8.0∗∗
Regional characteristics
Unemployment rate (UR) -2.3∗ 0.6 0.0 -0.5 -1.8∗ 1.0
Change in UR 1995-2000 -1.5∗∗ 0.5∗∗ 0.2 -3.3∗∗ 0.7∗ 0.7∗∗
GDP per head -0.5 -0.2 0.2 -0.7 0.3 0.4∗
Change of GDP 1995-2000 0.7∗∗ 0.1 -0.2∗∗ 0.3 -0.5∗∗ -0.2∗
Rate of business set ups 1.1∗∗ -0.2† 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3†
Share of long-term U -1.9∗∗ -0.4∗ 0.2 -3.2∗∗ 0.7∗ 0.9∗∗
Avg. yrs of schooling 1.8∗∗ -0.2 -0.5∗∗ 0.6 -0.3 -0.4∗
Placement counsellor per U 0.2 -0.4∗ 0.4∗∗ -1.2∗ -0.2 1.6∗∗
Share of U in ALMPR 0.1 0.5
∗∗ -0.1 -0.1 0.6† -0.1
Share of U in ALMPS -1.4
∗∗ 0.9∗∗ 0.1 -1.5∗ 1.1∗∗ 0.0
Driving time to higher level city 0.8∗∗ -0.2 -0.2† -0.2 0.1 0.2
Child care places & child 0.3 -0.3† -0.4∗∗ 0.4 0.4 -0.1
University present -2.6∗∗ 0.1 0.4 ∗∗ -1.8∗∗ -0.3 1.0∗∗
Saisonal unemployment -0.2 0.2 0.1 -2.5† 1.8† 0.0
Rural region -1.8∗∗ 0.0 0.2 1.6† -1.4∗∗ 0.2
Urban region -0.1 1.0∗∗ -0.9∗∗ 1.6∗ -0.6 -0.4
West & 2000 8.6∗∗ 0.5 1.4∗∗ 9.9∗∗ -1.1† 1.0∗
West & 2000 & female 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.3 -0.3 -1.0∗
West & 2001 2.5∗∗ 1.2∗ 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8
West & 2001 & female 2.0† 0.2 0.5 1.7 -0.8 0.0
East & 2000 -3.8∗∗ 2.0∗ 3.7∗∗ -7.8∗∗ 2.3 11.3∗∗
East & 2000 & female -6.5∗∗ 0.0 -0.7∗ 1.6 -2.1† -2.7∗∗
East & 2001 -2.0 0.5 3.6∗∗ -5.4∗∗ 1.7 6.8∗∗
East & 2001 & female -6.0∗∗ 0.3 -1.0∗∗ -1.8 -1.3 -1.5∗
East & 2002 0.1 0.0 2.6∗∗ -2.3 1.5 3.1∗∗
East & 2002 & female -6.6∗∗ 0.0 -1.1∗∗ -0.2 0.5 -1.5∗∗
Note: Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 euros. BE=Benefit entitlements;
ALMP=Active labour market program with focus on regular (R) or secondary (S) employment; U=Unemployment
‡: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for the low (higher) wage sample.
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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This result probably reflects the stronger labour force attachment of unemployed
people who are in minor employment. Individuals who commuted to their last job
have lower local but higher non-local employment probabilities. This may capture
both a higher propensity to migrate as well as a higher propensity to commute very
long distances.
Western/eastern Germany Despite the strong economic differences between
western and eastern Germany, conditional unemployment durations are surprisingly
similar. The much higher level of unemployment in eastern Germany and the long
average duration of unemployment thus have to be explained by the huge inflow
into unemployment just after reunification and the fact that many of these dis-
placed workers never found regular employment. For those entering unemployment
between 2000 and 2002, differences between the conditional unemployment duration
in eastern and western Germany are small and in many cases even disappear as we
reach the end of the observation period. With regard to subsidized employment this
is probably due to a reduction in the formally extensive public spending for sub-
sidized employment in eastern Germany. Nevertheless, married men from eastern
Germany with low pre-unemployment wages are still significantly more likely to end
up in subsidized employment. The likelihood of exiting to local regular employment
remains significantly lower for most unemployed people in eastern Germany than for
unemployed people in western Germany, whereas migration tends to be more likely
among the unemployed from eastern Germany. Individuals from eastern Germany
experience strong pull factors from western Germany which tends to increase their
migration probabilities compared to unemployed from western Germany for whom
such pull factors are likely to be much weaker.
Supply and demand conditions As expected, deficient local labour demand as
reflected in high and increasing unemployment levels, tends to reduce the proba-
bility of finding employment locally within one year among all groups, especially
among married men with high earning capacities. Among single people with higher
earning capacities, this prolonging effect on unemployment duration is partially off-
set by higher migration levels, while their married counterparts increasingly enter
subsidized employment in regions with an excess supply of labour. For individuals
with low earning capacities, such counteracting effects are even smaller or absent.
As a consequence, deficient local labour demand tends to prolong the duration of
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unemployment. In the absence of cushioning subsidized employment, this effect is
particularly strong among the locally immobile groups, namely married men and
individuals with low earning capacities.
Economic performance The indicators that proxy for the local economic per-
formance do not show any robust pattern across the different groups of unemployed.
The only exception is the strong and positive effect of the setting up of new local
businesses on the likelihood of finding local employment within one year for indi-
viduals with low earning capacities. One reason for this positive effect may be that
new firms tend to offer precarious jobs which are a more relevant type of employ-
ment for individuals on the fringe of the labour market. Apart from this noteworthy
effect, the effects of other local indicators of economic performance are negligible.
We therefore conclude that local economic performance does not seem to be an
important determinant of labour market outcomes for jobseekers in Germany, one
explanation of which may be that due to central wage bargaining regional produc-
tivity levels as reflected in local GDP do not translate into behaviorally relevant
interregional wage differences.
Social structure Indicators of the local social structure mainly confirm the the-
oretical notion that the social context affects job search behavior. As expected, a
high share of long-term unemployment significantly prolongs the duration of unem-
ployment as the strong decrease in local exits is only marginally offset by increasing
exits to non-local and subsidized employment. A low average schooling level comes
with similar but less strong effects. We conclude that a discouraging social context
indeed prolongs unemployment, but that there is no evidence that overall search
effort is reduced. At least for some individuals, migration and exits to subsidized
employment offer an alternative to continued unemployment.
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Table 5: Marginal effects in pp on the conditional cumu-
lative probability of exiting to local, subsidized or non-
local employment, Married Men
Low wage High wage
Variable local subsidized non-local local subsidized non-local
Individual characteristics
Age < 26 10.2∗∗ 0.0 0.8† 1.9 0.1 -0.2
Age 26-35 2.1 ∗∗ 0.5 0.5∗ 2.3∗∗ -0.3 -0.1
Age 46-56 -8.3∗∗ 2.8∗∗ -0.8∗∗ -5.7∗∗ 0.0 0.0
Age > 56 -22.1∗∗ 0.5 -2.2∗∗ -20.6∗∗ -5.6∗∗ -1.2∗∗
Unskilled -3.4∗∗ 1.1∗∗ 0.0 -1.5∗ -1.5∗∗ 0.1
University degree -7.0∗∗ 3.6∗∗ 0.1 -10.0∗∗ 2.5∗∗ 0.4
Foreign born -2.0∗∗ -1.5∗∗ 0.3 -5.7∗∗ -2.8∗∗ 0.8∗
Children -0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.2
Minor job 13.9∗∗ -0.4 -0.6 9.0∗∗ 1.0 -2.9∗∗
Spell starts in winter 10.0∗∗ 0.4 0.2 11.3∗∗ -2.7∗∗ 0.1
Previous employment history
Part time -4.6∗∗ -0.9∗ -0.4 n/a
Lower/upper wage‡ -8.2∗∗ 0.8∗ -0.5∗∗ -5.7∗∗ 2.8∗∗ 2.7∗∗
Construction 16.6∗∗ -1.8∗∗ -0.3 16.0∗∗ -3.4∗∗ -2.8∗∗
Trade and Food Ind. 12.0∗∗ -1.0∗ 0.2 6.5∗∗ -0.2 -1.0∗∗
Services/Public sector 6.9∗∗ -0.6† 0.8∗∗ -0.4 1.9∗∗ -0.1
Recall 12.3∗∗ -2.1∗∗ -0.3 16.1∗∗ -5.5∗∗ -0.5†
Unemployment 1.8∗ 1.2∗∗ 0.1 1.6† -0.4 0.3
Large firm -7.1∗∗ 0.5 -0.4 -4.5∗∗ -1.9∗∗ -0.2
BE 6-12 mths 1.2† 0.7∗ -0.3† -1.3† 1.7∗∗ -0.6∗∗
BE 12-18 mths 1.2 -0.5 -0.2 -6.9∗∗ 3.1∗∗ -1.3∗∗
BE 18-24 mths -1.2 1.1 -0.3 -9.0∗∗ 2.3∗∗ -1.4∗∗
BE > 24 mths -8.9∗∗ -3.1∗∗ -1.4∗∗ -27.3∗∗ 0.2 -3.1∗∗
ALMP measure -28.4∗∗ 7.2∗∗ -1.8∗∗ -29.2∗∗ 15.2∗∗ -1.8∗∗
Commuter -3.9∗∗ -0.4 5.2∗∗ -13.4∗∗ 0.4 8.9∗∗
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Regional characteristics
Unemployment rate (UR) 0.1 -1.3∗ 0.2 -4.5∗ 1.0 -0.1
Change in UR 1995-2000 -1.3∗∗ 0.1 -0.1 -4.3∗∗ 0.8∗ 0.1
GDP per head 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.2
Change of GDP 1995-2000 0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.2
Rate of business set ups 1.3 ∗∗ -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.1
Share of long-term U -3.7∗∗ 0.5† -0.2 -3.0∗∗ 0.3 0.7∗∗
Avg. yrs of schooling -1.1∗ -0.6∗ -0.4∗∗ 0.9 -0.1 -0.2
Placement counsellor per U -1.8∗∗ 0.2 0.3† -2.6∗∗ 0.6† 1.4 ∗∗
Share of U in ALMPR 0.5 0.1 -0.3
∗∗ 0.3 0.3 -0.5∗∗
Share of U in ALMPS 0.0 0.4
† -0.1 0.6 0.8∗ -0.6∗∗
Driving time to higher level city 1.1∗∗ 0.0 -0.2† 0.6 -0.2 -0.2∗
Child care places per child & child 0.8† -0.9∗∗ 0.2† 0.9 -0.4 0.0
University present -2.3∗∗ 0.2 0.4† -2.2∗∗ -0.5 0.0
Saisonal unemployment -3.2∗∗ 3.1∗∗ 0.0 -2.5 0.4 1.5 ∗
Rural region -0.4 0.2 0.4 2.9∗∗ -1.3∗ -0.4†
Urban region 1.4 0.1 -0.4∗ -0.2 -0.4 -0.6∗∗
West & 2000 13.5∗∗ -1.1† 1.1∗∗ 6.9∗∗ -1.6∗∗ 0.9∗
West & 2001 4.4∗∗ -1.3∗ 0.3 -1.9† -0.3 0.4
East & 2000 -3.3 6.3∗∗ 1.5† -5.9∗ -0.8 8.6∗∗
East & 2001 -0.8 3.4∗ 1.4† -4.9∗ -0.1 7.3∗∗
East & 2002 2.8 3.2∗∗ 1.5∗ -2.9 1.0 4.1∗∗
Note: Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 euros. BE=Benefit entitlements;
ALMP=Active labour market program with focus on regular (R) or secondary (S) employment; U=Unemployment
‡: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for the low (higher) wage sample.
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Institutional organization According to our findings, the recent emphasis on
job counseling that is, among other things, reflected in the increasing number of
job counsellors per unemployed jobseeker, is unlikely to substantially contribute to
a shortening of unemployment duration. This is because significant changes in the
likelihood of the three exit types almost balance out for all sub-samples. In particu-
lar, individuals with higher earning capacities are more likely to migrate and to exit
to subsidized employment while there are less local exits in regions with a higher
ratio of job counsellors to unemployed jobseekers. This may suggest that additional
human resources in job counselling speed up exits to migration and subsidized em-
ployment at the cost of local placement without resulting in a positive net effect on
the duration of unemployment. Similarly, we also find that an extensive local avail-
ability of labour market programs accelerates exits to subsidized employment at the
expense of exits to regular employment. Among single people, we mainly observe
less local exits, while among married men with higher earning capacities, subsidized
employment rather substitutes for non-local employment. There therefore seems to
be a small regional locking-in effect of active labour market policies for married men,
but not for single people. In a study for western Germany, Arntz (2005) only finds
a minor regional locking-in-effect for women.
Structural indicators The type of region as well as the driving time to the next
large city capture major differences in the availability of employment opportunities
within a commuting range. As the type of available jobs may differ depending on the
type of region, this may explain the heterogenous result pattern across sub-samples.
Rural regions, for example, tend to increase the local job finding chances of individu-
als with higher earning capacities, but have the opposite effect on low wage earners.
This may be due to a lack of unskilled service jobs in rural areas. Subsidized employ-
ment partially cushions these differences with increasing exit probabilities in rural
regions among low earning married men and decreasing exit probabilities for indi-
viduals with higher pre-unemployment earnings. Moreover, apart from single people
with high earning capacities, all other groups show higher local exit probabilities
in remotely located regions. This may suggest that relatively immobile groups of
unemployed lower their reservation wage in regions with a lack of accessible jobs
and thus experience faster exits to local employment.
The presence of a university reduces local job-finding among all groups and
increases migration probabilities among all but married men with low earning ca-
29
pacities. These results are in line with the idea that students may exert additional
congestion effects on the local labour market as students seek a minor job during
their studies and often start their job search after graduation in the local area. Fi-
nally, somewhat unexpectedly, a higher level of day care places per child weakly
accelerates local exits among married men, but not among single parents although
single parents are somewhat less likely to leave a region with an extensive child care
infrastructure. Thus, there is no evidence that the availability of public infrastruc-
ture strongly affects the duration of unemployment.
7 Summary, Conclusions and Outlook
In the light of recent labour market reforms, this paper explores the extent to which
the unemployment compensation system, the local organization of job placement
and regional policies determine the duration of unemployment in Germany. For
this purpose we perform a comprehensive analysis of unemployment duration using
the latest generation of administrative individual data and a broad set of regional
aggregate data in the period 2000-2004. By distinguishing three exit states, local
regular employment, non-local regular employment and subsidized employment we
are able to disentangle the effects of individual and regional characteristics on these
destination states. This is highly relevant because both individual and regional
characteristics often have diverging effects on the three destination states. As a
consequence, previous estimates may have been biased if non-local or subsidized
employment have not been separated from exits to local employment.
Based on competing-risk Cox proportional hazard estimates, we generally obtain
that individual characteristics and in particular an individual’s work history strongly
affect the duration of unemployment and the chosen destination state while the
effect of regional factors such as the unemployment rate is often rather small. This is
consistent with German and international evidence concerning the impact of regional
labour market conditions on the duration of unemployment until exiting to a local
or non-local job (Kettunen, 2003; Yankow, 2002; Arntz, 2005). Regional disparities
thus appear to be much less important than usually considered by the German public
and by German policy makers. Even between western and eastern Germany, the
conditional unemployment duration is very similar. Therefore, our results suggest
that regional policies may only be a supplementary means of improving labour
market outcomes of unemployed individuals.
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Similarly, there is no evidence that public counselling efforts and ALMP have
much of an shortening effect on the duration of unemployment. In the case of ALMP
we even obtain slightly negative labour market outcomes:
• Previous ALMP participants often end up in ALMP again (ALMP-careers).
• Migration rates are lower in regions where extensive use is made of ALMP
(regional locking-in-effect).
These results indicate that the recent restructuring efforts of public employment ser-
vices are unlikely to bring about a substantial reduction in unemployment. Nonethe-
less, restructuring efforts may contribute to the increasing efficiency of public spend-
ing, an aspect that we do not analyze in our work. For this reason and given our
econometric approach it is difficult to compare our results directly with international
evaluation studies which are available for several countries, e.g. the UK (Blundell,
Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen, 2004) and the Netherlands (van den Berg and
van den Klaauw, 2006).
We obtain a number of indications that the unemployment compensation and
welfare system strongly affect individual labour market outcomes:
• Individuals with low pre-unemployment earnings and thus high income re-
placement rates have the lowest exit hazards to regular employment.
• Older individuals with extremely long UB entitlements basically never leave
for regular employment as they use UB as a means of early retirement.
We therefore conclude that the reduction of UB entitlements and income replace-
ment rates are likely to drastically shorten unemployment for certain groups. A
strong effect of the unemployment compensation system on the duration of unem-
ployment has already been observed in the past. Christensen (2005) shows that
social benefit recipients with high reservation wages are unlikely to leave unemploy-
ment. Similarly, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) find that unemployed people with
lower former wages are much less likely to leave unemployment. Mu¨ller et al. (2007)
evaluate a reform of the unemployment benefit system in 1997 which reduced en-
titlement length for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. They show that
this reform was successful in drastically reducing inflow to unemployment and the
duration of unemployment in the relevant group of unemployed.
31
Although our approach is fairly comprehensive and includes new data, it still has
several limitations. Alternative destination states such as leaving the labour force
or retirement, for example, should be an important extension to our competing
risk approach. Unfortunately, our data does not provide information on these exit
states such that we leave this extension to future research. Moreover, the fact that
we do not observe the true length of the unemployment duration may affect our
results. In addition, our econometric approach faces the methodological difficulty
that a certain share of our unemployed population has zero probability for an exit to
regular employment. This is known as the mover - stayer problem in the literature
(Abbring, 2002; Addison and Portugal 2003) and results in the defectiveness of
the unemployment duration distribution. Our estimation results may therefore be
biased, but as the degree of defectiveness is limited in our data, this problem may be
of minor importance. Our model does not include random effects in order to account
for individual unobserved heterogeneity. For this reason we left the baseline hazard
nonparametric and do not draw attention to it because it is likely to be biased.
Also the assumption of proportional hazard rates can be incorrect as Fitzenberger
and Wilke (2006a and 2006b) have shown with similar data that this assumption
is implausible for several regressors. A more flexible approach which allows the
effect of the regressors on the conditional distribution of unemployment duration to
vary over the quantiles and thus even crossing of the conditional hazard rates, may
provide more detailed insights. The empirical analysis in this paper still provides
many new insights and it raises several interesting research questions which are left
for future research.
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Appendix A - Summary Statistics by sub-samples
Singles Married Men
Individual characteristics Low Wage Higher Wage Low Wage Higher Wage
Female 41.7 26.0 n/a
Age < 26 41.4 21.2 4.4 2.5
Age 26-35 27.4 39.1 23.5 24.6
Age 46-56 10.5 12.0 30.6 28.5
Age > 56 1.8 2.0 8.0 7.0
Unskilled 52.2 30.5 45.9 32.4
University degree 1.6 7.2 1.5 5.6
Foreign born 6.2 5.3 16.9 12.4
Female foreign born 2.2 1.1 n/a
Children 21.2 18.0 63.1 66.7
Children & female 11.6 4.8 n/a
Minor job 8.6 1.0 8.8 1.3
Spell starts in winter 32.0 39.1 37.6 45.2
Previous employment history
Part time 20.3 4.6 n/a
Lower/upper wage‡ 39.5 22.9 26.6 27.8
Lower/upper wage‡ & female 18.6 6.7 n/a
Construction 4.3 2.8 6.5 4.3
Trade and Food Ind. 14.7 26.2 25.8 35.7
Services/Public sector 44.2 33.8 38.2 29.0
Recall 12.2 20.2 19.9 28.3
Unemployment 61.9 64.9 74.9 66.8
Large firm 7.0 10.3 5.1 7.0
BE 6-12 mths 43.4 49.2 31.5 39.7
BE 12-18 mths 1.1 2.0 3.4 4.5
BE 18-24 mths 0.9 2.2 3.3 5.7
BE > 24 mths 0.9 2.2 3.7 7.0
ALMP measure 9.4 1.5 12.5 1.3
Commuter 20.8 27.7 20.8 29.2
Number of unemployment spells 74,724 28,168 28,018 23,620
Note: All covariates are dummy variables. BE=Benefit entitlements; ALMP= Active labour market programs
Minor Job = Job < 15 hrs/week while unemployed at the beginning of unemployment
‡: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage
quartile for the low (higher) wage sample.
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